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s1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Matching models has been successfully used to describe many real-life situations like
the college admissions problems and centralized job markets as the NRMP (National
Resident Matching Program). Sometimes, in these situations the workers (or the
students) are concerned not only about the characteristics of the ﬁrms or institutions
to wich they are assigned but also about the co-workers in each ﬁrm. See Roth and
Sotomayor [8] for a discussion. A problem relative to matching markets, which is still
open, is very close to the following fact. Let us consider a research center that wants
to hire a new researcher. It is usual that, among the conditions considered in the
contractual terms, by the (potential) new researcher, the agents previously hired by
that institution play an important role. Therefore, when considering an oﬀer, each
individual might consider as an important feature who will be her colleagues. This
paper deals with matching markets in which the agents on one side of the market
care about their colleagues.
A ﬁrst approach to this problem was introduced by Dutta and Massó [6]. They
study the case in which some individuals have couples in the same market, and each
couple considers important to be hired by the same institution. In this framework
it is well-known that stable outcomes may not exist. This explains why Dutta and
Massó focus on conditions on agents’ preferences guaranteeing the existence of stable
matchings. They obtain two positive results. The ﬁrst positive result is obtained
when only couples are allowed, when some conditions on preferences are combined:
togetherness and group substitutability. They also obtain some negative results when
coalitions of any size are allowed, except with F-lexicographic preferences. When
workers’ preferences are F-lexicographic (the workers only cares about the colleagues
when the ﬁrm is ﬁxed) the model is very close to the classical many-to-one matching
in which the co-workers do not appear in the workers’ preferences.
The main criticism we can propose concerning to the Dutta-Massó approach is
that they consider that couples are exogenously given. In this paper we extend their
analysis in two ways. First, couples or colleagues groups, are not exogenously given.





























srestrict ourselves to the case in which groups of colleagues are composed of only two
individuals. In fact, this paper might be presented as an uniﬁcation of two models
that have captured the interest of some researchers, say the many-to-one matching
problems, introduced by Gale and Shapley [7] and the hedonic coalition formation
problems, introduced by Drèze and Greenberg [5]. Sometimes the coalition formation
models have been used to describe the formation of academic departments, research
groups, medical teams and many other real-life examples as groups of workers. There-
fore, if a worker receives a job oﬀer, in order to decide accept or rejected it, should
consider both problems. We will call this combined problem Coalition-Matching
problems.
Relative to the ﬁrst family of problems, the matching models, the literature pro-
vided two elegant options to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. In fact,
no restriction is imposed on individuals’ preferences over outcomes, and simple and
very intuitive restrictions on institutions’ preferences over allocations are enough to
guarantee the existence of stable matchings. Both conditions, called responsiveness
and substitutability, introduce a kind of separability on the institutions’ preferences
over groups of individuals to be matched with.
Concerning the second class of problems, the hedonic coalition formation prob-
lems, the literature provides some conditions to guarantee the existence of stable
allocations. The papers by Banerjee et al. [3] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [4]
provide conditions over individuals’ preference proﬁles under which stable allocations
do exist. The paper by Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2] and Alcalde and Revilla
[1] study conditions on individuals’ preferences to guarantee the existence of stable
outcomes for coalition formation problems.
In this paper, we focus on a problem much harder to be solved than the two prob-
lems we combine. In fact, one might be tempted to think of the following possibility
to solve our general problem. Let us assume that institutions’ preferences satisfy
substitutability, and individuals’ preferences fullﬁl the tops responsiveness condition
(in the sense deﬁned in the paper by Alcalde and Revilla [1]). The reader can think





























sNevertheless, this straight conclusion is not true! This same argument for wrong
straight conclusions could be provided for any combination of conditions on institu-
tions preferences yielding to stable allocations in the classical many-to-one matching
problem and the conditions provided in the above-mentioned papers for the coalition
formation problem.
Our approach to the study of stability in the framework of matching problems
when colleagues are considered by some individuals is similar to that used by Dutta
and Massó [6], i.e., we propose conditions on agents’ preferences under which stable
allocations always exist. A condition explored in this paper, which is suﬃcient for
the existence of stable allocations, comes from a generalization of Dutta and Massó’s
Togetherness,t h a tw ec a l lGroup Togetherness. Finally, and also related to the results
by Dutta and Massó [6], we present a way to avoid some negative results. In fact, these
authors present a condition called Unanimous Ranking According to Desirability
which is applied to the individuals’ preferences. In this paper a diﬀerent version
of that condition is used over the preferences of individuals and institutions and a
positive result can be obtained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sec-
tion 3 shows that conditions stronger than those used in the two classical problems,
a r en e e d e di nac o a l i t i o nm a t c h i n gp r o b l e m . S e c t i o n4a n ds e c t i o n5p r e s e n tp o s i -
tive results in two diﬀerent frameworks. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes. The appendix
includes two examples without stable allocations that satisfy other conditions.
2 The Model
There is a set F =
©
f1,...,f`ª
of ﬁrmsand a set W = {w1,...,w n} of workers. Each
ﬁrm fj’s preferences are a linear ordering P(fj) deﬁned over 2W ∪
©
fjª
.T h u sﬁrms
only care about the set of its employees. Workers’ preferences are deﬁned over pairs
consisting of one ﬁrm and a set of workers. Each worker wi’s preferences are a linear
ordering P(wi) deﬁned over (F ×Wi)∪{wi},w h e r eWi = {S | S ⊆ W,wi ∈ S}. Here,
{wi} represents an unemployed worker. In this case, we consider that the unemployed





























sconﬁguration is a partition of W.
A coalition matching problem is a many-to-one matching problem in which
each agent cares about the agents matched to the same ﬁrm as she is. Then a
coalition matching problem is fully described by a set of ﬁrms, a set of workers, and
a preference proﬁle, i.e. a list {F,W,P}.
A matching speciﬁes who works where. Formally, a matching µ is a correspon-
dence from F ∪ W to itself such that
1) for all fj ∈ F,i fµ
¡
fj¢













Let M (F,W,P) be the set of all matchings for {F,W,P}.G i v e nµ ∈ M (F,W,P)





A matching is individually rational if no agent prefers to be unmatched to his
assignment at the matching.
Am a t c h i n gµ ∈ M (F,W,P) is Individually Rational (IR) for {F,W,P},i f
for all fj ∈ F and all wi ∈ W:








Let I (F,W,P) be the set of IR matchings for {F,W,P}.
A wide class of concepts of stability exists in the literature on matching and
coalition formation. For our problem, we propose a concept of stability that is very
similar to standard concepts of core stability.2 Given {F,W,P}, a matching µ ∈
M (F,W,P) is stable for {F,W,P} if there is no e µ ∈ M (F,W,P) and a set V ⊂
1To be precise, µ
2 (wi) is the set of wi’s colleagues with wi inclosed. Note that the wi’s preferences
are deﬁned over elements from W
i.
2A deviation by a worker might produce a reaction from her old colleagues (and her new colleagues)
who could prefer another ﬁrm and group of co-workers.Thus, the standard concept of pairwise stabil-






























sF ∪ W such that:
1) (e µ(wi),e µ2(wi))P(wi)((µ(wi),µ 2(wi)), for all wi ∈ V .
2) e µ(fj)P(fj)µ(fj), for all fj ∈ V .
3) e µ(wi) ∈ V , for all wi ∈ V .
4) e µ(fj) ⊂ V , for all fj ∈ V .
We say that such a V blocks µ.3 Let C (F,W,P) be the set of stable matchings
for {F,W,P}. Obviously, C (F,W,P) ⊂ I (F,W,P).
3 Well-known solutions.
In this section we show that even when two conditions, coalitional substitutability
and F-essentiality, are required, a stable matching may not exist. Substitutability
is a suﬃcient condition on ﬁrms preferences for the existence of stable matchings
in the classical many-to-one matching model (Roth and Sotomayor [8]). Coalitional
substitutability, the counterpart for our model of the property called group substi-
tutability by Dutta and Massó [6], is stronger than substitutability. F-essentiality
is the counterpart for our model of a suﬃcient condition for the existence of stable
coalition formation structures proposed by Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2]. In the
coalition formation literature, tops responsiveness (Alcalde and Revilla [1]), a weaker
condition than F-essentiality, is suﬃcient for stability. Example 6 of the appendix
satisﬁes tops responsiveness and coalitional substitutability and no stable matching
exists.
Given a set S ⊂ W,a n daﬁrm fj with preferences P
¡
fj¢
,l e tChfj (S) denote
the most preferred subset of W for fj.
Firm fj’s preference, P(fj), satisﬁes substitutability if for all S ⊆ W, and all
wi, wh ∈ S, (i 6= h), wi ∈ Chfj (S) implies wi ∈ Chfj (S\{wh}),w i t hChfj (S) being
maximal on S for P
¡
fj¢
. Our deﬁnition below diﬀers from the original notion of
substitutability because it states conditions on worker sets rather than on workers.
Coalitional substitutability is stronger than substitutability.
3Notice that 3) and 4) imply that e µ





























sFirm fj’s preference, P
¡
fj¢
satisﬁes Coalitional Substitutability if for all S ⊆
W, all partition of S, b S = {S1,....,Sk},a n da l lSl, Sh ∈ b S, (l 6= h),i fSl ⊆ Chfj (S),
then Sl ⊆ Chfj (S\Sh).4
We need to introduce additional restrictions on preferences to reach our objective.
We extent the essentiality condition presented by Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2] to
our current framework.
Let fj ∈ F and wi ∈ W. The coalition Tj ∈ Wi, containing worker wi,i s
essential relative to f j for wi if and only if, for all T,T0 ∈ Wi:





2) If Tj 6= {wi},t h e n

















A preference proﬁle satisﬁes F-essentiality for {F,W,P}, if and only if for all
wi ∈ W and all fj ∈ F, there exists a coalition that is essential for wi relative to fj.
For all wi ∈ W, the coalition whose existence is stated in the condition may
diﬀer according to which ﬁrm the worker is matched to. In other words, the set of
colleagues that is essential for a worker in general, depends on the ﬁrm to which she
is assigned.
Coalitional substitutability and F-essentiality are not suﬃcient to guarantee the
existence of a stable matching. This is shown by the following example.
Example 1: Let F =
©
f1 ,f2,f3ª
and W = {w1,w 2,w 3}.L e t P be the pref-
erence proﬁle given by the following table, where elements are ranked in descending
4Dutta and Massó [6] propose a condition on the institutions’ preferences called Group Substi-





























sorder of preference and only acceptable partners are listed:
f1 f2 f3
{w2,w 3}{ w1,w 2}{ w1,w 3}
{w1,w 2}{ w1,w 3}{ w2,w 3}
{w1,w 3}{ w2,w 3}{ w1,w 2}
{w3}{ w2}{ w3}
{w2}{ w1}{ w1}


























f1,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª©
f1,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª©







f2,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª
©
f3,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª©
f3,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª©
f3,w 1,w 2,w 3
ª
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}
Firms’ preferences satisfy coalitional substitutability. Workers’ preferences satisfy
F-essentiality but not separability.
Claim: there is no stable matching.










ii) No matching µ0 such that µ0 ¡
fj¢











¯ ¯ ∈ {0,2},i . e . e a c h
ﬁrm is assigned two individuals or none. Hence, for all µ00 ∈ C (F,W,P);
µ00 ¡
fj¢










To show that there is no stable matching, we ﬁnd that no matching having




































for all fj 6= f1.
2) µ00 ¡
f2¢





for all fj 6= f2.
3) µ00 ¡
f3¢





for all fj 6= f3.
These matchings are blocked by {w1}.
4) µ00 ¡
f2¢





for all fj 6= f2.
This matching is blocked by {w2}.
5) µ00 ¡
f1¢





for all fj 6= f1.
6) µ00 ¡
f3¢





for all fj 6= f3.
These matchings are blocked by {w3}.
7) µ00 ¡
f1¢





for all fj 6= f1.












for all j 6=2 .












for all j 6=3 .






4 Positive result: Group Togetherness.
In this section, we present conditions that ensure the existence of stable matchings
when workers only care about an acceptable group of colleagues. In many situations
individuals prefer matchings in which they are together to matchings in which they
are not (Dutta and Massó [6]). We present a generalized version of togetherness
that applies to settings in which groups may be of any size. Our condition, which is
stronger than F-essentiality, is called Essentiality. The diﬀerence between Essential-





























sto F-essentiality: separability. In our framework, separability implies that workers’
preferences over ﬁrms are independent of their preferences over sets of colleagues.
Let wi ∈ W. Here, wi’s preferences are separable if for all S,S0 ∈ Wi and all





























Note that, under separability, the preferences of each worker wi, P (wi), induce
two binary relations, her preferences over ﬁr m s( l e tu sd e n o t et h i sr e l a t i o na sPF
i ),
and her preferences over colleagues (let us denote this relation as PC
i ). These relations



















for all S, S0 ∈ Wi and all fj ∈ F.
From now on, we assume that workers’ preferences are separable.
It is easy to see that coalitional substitutability and separability do not guarantee
the existence of a stable matching. This is shown by Example 6 in the appendix.
If separability and F-essentiality are imposed, the coalition that is essential for a
worker has to be the same whatever ﬁrm hires her. This is what motives the following
deﬁnition.
Let P (wi) be a separable and linear ordering for worker wi. Coalition Te
i ,c o n -
taining worker wi,i sessential for her if and only if her restricted preferences over
coalitions are such that, for all T, T0 ⊂ Wi:
1) If Te
i = {wi},t h e n{wi} PC
i Ti for all T 6= {wi} and
2) If Te
i 6= {wi},t h e n
(a) {wi} PC
i T i fa n do n l yi fTe
i * T,a n d
(b) if Te
i ⊆ T ⊂ T0 then Ti PC
i T0
i.
A worker’s preferences satisfy essentiality whenever there exists a coalition that
is essential for her. Note that, under essentiality, whatever ﬁrm the worker works





























sTo obtain positive results concerning the existence of stable matchings, we need
to introduce a further property: Group Togetherness. This additional requirement
refers to the intensity of workers’ preferences concerning a particular item on her
preferences. A worker prefers the matchings in which she is matched to an acceptable
set of colleagues more than the others. But if she compares two matchings with
acceptable sets of colleagues, it does not matter which coalition is better for her. In
the last case, the worker only cares about the ﬁrm.
Let (fj,T), (fh,T0) be such that T,T0 ⊂ Wi.T h e n P (wi) satisﬁes Group
Togetherness (GT) if
1) If {wi} PC
i T and {wi} PC
i T
0
then (fj,T) Pi (fh,T0) iﬀ fj PF
i fh.
2) If TP C
i {wi} and T0 PC
i {wi} then (fj,T) Pi (fh,T0) iﬀ fj PF
i fh.
3) If TP C
i {wi} and {wi} PC
i T
0
then (fj,T) Pi (fh,T0).
To introduce the result in this section we need an algorithm that yields stable
matchings under some of the above mentioned conditions: essentiality and group
togetherness. In that algorithm, a coalition conﬁguration of workers is obtained in a
ﬁrst part and a matching between those coalitions and ﬁrms is obtained in the second
part. If there are some workers’ coalition that could not ﬁnd a ﬁrm that hires them,
this coalition is broken up and a new second part of the añgorithm has to be applied.
The algorithm and their properties are shown in the following.
We present an algorithm, which can be understood as the conjunction of two
well-known algorithms:
The ﬁrst one is the ess-algorithm deﬁned by Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2]
which, when applied to a coalition formation problem in which essentiality is satisﬁed,
produces a stable coalition conﬁguration of workers.
The other is the multistage-deferred-acceptance algorithm deﬁned by Gale and
Shapley [7] for matching problems. It is applied to a matching problem in which the
agents are the ﬁrms and the coalitions of workers that have been obtained in the
previous ess-algorithm. These coalitions make oﬀers to the ﬁrms as in Dutta and
Massó [6], i.e. if there is any coalition that is not assigned to any ﬁrm then a new






























Part 1: Let σ :2 W → 2W be the function that associates with each set of
workers, T ⊆ W, the coalition
σ (T)=∪wi∈T {S ⊆ W | S is essential for wi}.
For each wi ∈ W ,l e tS0
i = {wi}.
Stage 1: Let S1
i = σ ({wi}).I f S1
i = S0
i , the algorithm stops. The outcome is
Si = S1
i . Otherwise, go to stage 2.








i , the algorithm stops. The outcome is
Si = Sk
i .O t h e r w i s e ,g ot os t a g ek +1 .
The coalition Tσ













wi∈W. It is a partition of the set of workers if the coalition
formation problem satisﬁes essentiality (Alcalde and Romero-Medina [2]).
Part 2: Let the matching problem in which the set of agents on one side is F and
on the other one is Tσ, the partition obtained in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ea l g o r i t h m .T h e
algorithm takes as preferences of each element of Tσ, the preferences of one worker
in each coalition. Let Tσ
q be a coalition from Tσ,a n de wq be the agent with the lowest
subindex in Tσ
q . The preferences of Tσ
q in the matching problem are the preferences







= P (e wq) deﬁned over F × WTσ
q .6 Denote the matching problem
deﬁned in this way as M1.
Stage 1: Let M1 be the many-to-one matching problem. Each coalition of workers,
Tσ
q ,m a k e so ﬀers to their most preferred ﬁrms according to e wq’s preferences.
5A family of algorithms can be deﬁned depending on how the worker, whose preferences will be
used, is selected. For instance, the worker with the highest subindex can be selected, or someone
randomly.
6Note that, as separability is required, the algorithm only needs to take the restricted preferences

































sFirms accept the oﬀers if they are acceptable, otherwise reject. Let b µ1 be the
resulting matching. Let b T1 =
©
Tσ






. If for all S ∈ Tσ such that
|S| > 1, S ∈ b T1, the algorithm stops. The matching is b µ1.
Otherwise, there is an unmatched coalition of workers from Tσ,s a yTσ
q .G ot o
stage 2.
Stage 2: Let M2 be the many-to-one matching problem that is obtained when such
Tσ












be the set coalitions that have to be broken up. The set of individuals in the









tions that are not accepted by any ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage are replaced by the
workers who are in that coalitions. Apply the deferred-acceptance algorithm
with workers or coalitions making oﬀers to M2.
Stage k: Let Mk be the many-to-one matching problem with the set of ﬁrms, F,
and the set of individuals: b Tk−1 ∪
©













is the set of coalitions matched with a ﬁrm













set of unmatched coalitions with more that one worker in the previous stage.
Consider as preferences for the members of b Tk−1 the preferences of the worker
with the lowest subindex in each coalition, and for remaining agents (ﬁrms
and single workers) their true preferences. Individuals (workers and coalitions)
make oﬀers to their most preferred ﬁrms, and ﬁrms accept (or reject) the oﬀers










. If for all S ∈ Tσ such that |S| > 1, S ∈ b Tk,t h e
algorithm stops. The matching is b µk. Otherwise, go to the stage k +1 .
We denote the matching resulting from this algorithm as µ∗, and the the coalition
of colleagues assigned to wi as T∗
i = µ∗ (µ∗(wi)).
To illustrate this algorithm, consider the following example.
Example 2: Let F =
©
f1,f 2,f 3ª
and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5,w 6},w i t h





























sg i v e ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l e :
f1 f2 f3
{w2,w 6}{ w1,w 2,w 3}{ w3,w 5,w 6}
{w2,w 5}{ w1,w 2}{ w3,w 5}
{w5,w 6}{ w1,w 3}{ w5,w 6}





Workers’ preferences satisfy separability and are such that
w1 : PC
1 Ch1 (W)={w1,w 2}.
w2 : PC
2 Ch2 (W)={w1,w 2,w 3}.
w3 : PC
3 Ch3 (W)={w1,w 3}.
w4 : PC
4 Ch4 (W)={w4,w 5}.
w5 : PC
5 Ch5 (W)={w4,w 5}.
w6 : PC
6 Ch6 (W)={w3,w 5,w 6}.
for all wi ∈ W; f1PF
i f2PF
i f3.
The algorithm selects the following sets for each worker,
Tσ












6 proposes to f1.F i r mf1 only accepts {w6}.
- Tσ
1 and Tσ
4 propose to f2.F i r mf2 only accepts Tσ
1 .
- Tσ
4 proposes to f3.F i r mf3 rejects Tσ
4 .
Then Tσ
4 is broken up and a new deferred-acceptance algorithm’s stage is applied
with the sets of workers: Tσ
1 ,T σ






































sThe matching µ∗ is stable.¨
Next we show that if workers’ preferences satisfy essentiality and GT, the algo-
rithm yields a stable matching. We need two lemmas.
Lemma 1: The Group deferred-acceptance algorithm always terminates.
The ess-algorithm always terminates in ﬁnitely many (Alcalde and Romero-
Medina [2]) and when ﬁrms’ preferences satisfy substitutability, the deferred-acceptance
algorithm always terminates in a ﬁnite number of stages (Gale and Shapley[7].)
Hence, the ess-algorithm produces a partition of the set of workers that will be
assigned to a ﬁrm later on.
Lemma 2: The Group deferred-acceptance algorithm yields a matching.
In the ess-algorithm, the ﬁnal stage is a simple deferred-acceptance algorithm in
which the workers are replaced by coalitions of colleagues that have been previously
formed. It is well known that a matching is obtained (Gale and Shapley [7]). Here, as
no worker can be in two coalitions in the outcome of the ess-algorithm, a matching
is obtained.
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 1 If ﬁrms’ preferences satisfy Coalitional Substitutability, workers’ prefer-
ences satisfy Essentiality and GT, the Group deferred-acceptance algorithm produces
a stable matching.
Proof. By lemmas 1 and 2 we only need to prove that the matching is stable. In
order to prove stability we show that the matching is IR and that there is no blocking
group.
Step 1. The matching belongs to I (F,W,P):T h i si ss of o re v e r yﬁrm, by coalitional
substitutability. If a ﬁrm has hired any group of workers then it does not want
to ﬁre everyone. For every worker who is working with her essential set (or a
superset of it), by GT the matching is preferred to be unemployed. For every
worker who is not working with her essential set (or a superset) also by GT,





























sStep 2. No group blocks the matching: suppose that there exists (fj,S) that blocks
the matching that results in the algorithm, µ∗. We check that in all possible
cases, a contradiction appears.
• Let wi ∈ S and Te






(otherwise fj does not hire µ∗ ¡
fj¢
\S). This contradicts the assumption




does not block µ∗.I ffj 6= µ∗ (wi),
there is wj ∈ T∗






does not block µ∗)o rwj / ∈ Te
i .I fwj / ∈ Tσ




i ⊂ S then T∗
i PC (wi) S.S i n c ewi ∈ S, this contradicts
the assumption that (fj,S) blocks µ∗.
2) If T∗
i * S then there is wh such that wh ∈ Te
i ⊂ S and
T∗
i P (wh) ∅ P(wh)S.
Then wh does not block µ∗.A swh ∈ S, this contradicts that
(fj,S) blocks µ∗.
• Let wi ∈ S,a n dTe
i * S and Te
i ⊆ µ∗2 (wi). Then by GT, a contradiction
exists.
• Let wi ∈ S,a n dTe












fj 6= µ∗ (wi). In the last case there is wj ∈ Te
i ⊂ S such that µ∗ (wi)
P (wj) fj. It contradicts that (fj,S) blocks µ∗.
• Let wi ∈ S,a n dTe
i * µ∗2 (wi) then fj P (wi) µ∗ (wi) (otherwise wi does not
block µ∗) but by coalitional substitutability and the ess-algorithm fj does
not prefer to hire wi. Then either S = µ∗2 (wi) or we reach a contradiction.
But if fj 6= µ∗ (wi) then there is wj ∈ S,such that µ∗ (wi) P(wj) fj.T h i s

































can block, and thus µ∗ ∈ C (F,W,P).¥
In the paper by Alcalde and Revilla [1], it is shown that a property, called Tops
Responsiveness condition (TRC), weaker than essentiality, is suﬃcient for the non-
emptiness of the core in the Coalition Formation Problem. In this framework, it
is easy to show that a stable matching may not exist if we require TRC instead of
essentiality. Note that the example 6 in the appendix also satisﬁes separability and
coalitional substitutability.
5 Positive result: Common Best Colleague.
Sometimes people are concerned about their own colleagues rather than the ﬁrms
which hire them in a more absolute way than GT indicates. Think of young re-
searchers who have to choose among some research centers or institutes in which the
labor conditions are very similar. The ﬁrst question for most of them is: If I choose
that institute, who are the researchers I can work with? That means that the re-
searchers evaluate a matching in a lexicographic way. First, they consider the group
of colleagues. And if they are indiﬀerent, then they consider other features of the
institute or center. In this section we consider the case in which the workers have
W-lexicographic preferences, as deﬁned here.
The worker wi’s preferences are W-lexicographic if, for all S, T ∈ Wi, S 6= T
and for all fj, fh ∈ F, the following condition is satisﬁed:
(fj,S)P(wi)(fh,T) ⇔ SPC
i T.
We need other conditions over preferences to ensure stability. Dutta and Massó
[6] show that if the workers’ preferences satisfy a condition called Unanimous Ranking
According to Desirability, a stable matching may not exist in their framework. We
deﬁne a new condition that if the workers’ preferences restricted to colleagues satisfy,
guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We call it Common best Colleague
condition (CBC). A new result is obtained: If the ﬁrms’ preferences consider the
same ranking over workers then a stable matching exists. From now on, we assume





























saccording to such a ranking. So, the subindex of each workers reﬂects her position in
that ranking. In order to deﬁne CBC, we need additional notation.
Let S,T ⊆ W be such that S 6= T. Suppose that a ranking over the workers
denoted by the subindexes exists. We deﬁne Ψ1 as follows:
Ψ1 (S,T)={wi}; such that wi ∈ SÂT; and i =i n f{h : wh ∈ SÂT}.
Similarly, we denote Ψ2 (S,T)=Ψ1 (T,S).I nw o r d s :Ψ1 selects the worker from the
ﬁrst set with the lowest subindex that is not in the other set. Note that if S ⊂ T,
SÂT = ∅.T h e nΨ1 (S,T)=∅.A n ds i m i l a r l yf o rΨ2 (S,T) when T ⊂ S.
Then, we can compare two sets only by looking at the two workers with the
lowest subindex from each set that are not in the other set. This allows us to present
a property that explains how the agents can compare two sets of workers if a complete
ranking over workers is commonly assumed.
In words: if wi’s preferences satisfy Common Best Colleague condition, wi chooses
between two groups of colleagues, S and T, that group containing the agent with the
lower subindex who is not in the other set. And if S is a subset of T, wi chooses T
if there is any agent in TÂS who is below wi in the ranking.7
Aw o r k e r ’ s( s a ywi) preferences satisfy the Common Best Colleague Condi-
tion (CBC) if for all S,T ∈ Wi and S,T 6= ∅:
1) If SÂT 6= ∅, TÂS 6= ∅, and Ψ1 (S,T) has a lower subindex than Ψ2 (S,T),
then SP C
i T.
2) If S ⊂ T and there is wk ∈ T\S such that k<i ,then TP C
i S.
The following examples show the preferences of a worker when CBC is satisﬁed.
Example 3: Let S = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 5} and T = {w1,w 3,w 4,w 6}.L e t b e a
ranking denoted by the subindexes. Here, SÂT = {w2,w 5} and TÂS = {w4,w 6}.
In this case: Ψ1 (S,T)={w2} and Ψ2 (S,T)=Ψ1 (T,S)={w4}, respectively. So, if
every worker’s preferences satisﬁes CBC, SP C
i T, for each worker in S ∪ T.¨
Example 4: Let S = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 5} and T = {w1,w 3}. Here, Ψ1 (S,T)={w2}
and Ψ2 (S,T)=Ψ1 (T,S)=∅. Assume that CBC is satisﬁed by the preferences of all
7Note that wi only compares S and T if wi belongs to both sets. Then wi is not a member of
Ψ






























sthe agents. So, SP C
3 T because w2 has a higher subindex than w3. But it is possible
that TP C
1 S,b e c a u s ew2 has a lower position in the ranking than w1.¨
We say that CBC is fulﬁlled in a coalition matching problem if every worker
satisﬁes CBC with the same ranking. It can be shown that if the workers’ preferences
satisfy CBC and we only require Coalitional Substitutability for the ﬁrms’ preferences
a stable matching may not exist (Example 7 in the appendix).
However, a positive result can be obtained if the CBC requirements are extended
to the ﬁrms’ preferences. As CBC has been deﬁned for workers we deﬁne CBC for
ﬁrms.
A ﬁrm’s (say fj) preferences satisfy the Common Best Colleague Condition
(CBC) if for all S, T ⊆ W:





If S ⊂ T nothing is required for the ﬁrms’ preferences.
In order to prove the existence of stable matchings we need an algorithm that
selects a stable matching when it is applied. We call this algorithm, CBC algorithm.
We can think of a real life situation in which a leader, a worker who obtains the
ﬁrst position in the common ranking, exists. The leader may be a researcher who
proposes to other researchers form a research group, and that looks for a University
or an Institute (we call it ﬁrm) that hires the whole group. If everyone (University
and researchers) agree the contract is signed and these agents are retired from algo-
rithm. Otherwise, the leader tries to form a new group. Each stage in the algorithm,
reﬂecting the process in which each leader tries to form a group and ﬁnd a center
that hires them, has 3 steps.
To present the CBC algorithm we need additional notation. Let Φi (F,W) be the
set of possible pairs of ﬁrm and set of coworkers for agent wi when the set of ﬁrms is




∈ F × Wiª
∪ {wi}.
Then each element from Φi (F,W) is a pair of one ﬁrm and a set of workers that
includes wi or wi remaining alone. For notational convenience we consider the last

































sThe CBC algorithm,i sd e ﬁned as follows:
Stage 1: Let F1 = F and T1 = W .
Step 1: Let w1, the worker with the lowest subindex in T1,b et h eleader.L e t
D1
1 = Φ1 (F1,W 1).
Step 2: Let
³
e f1, e S1
´
∈ Φ1 (F1,W 1) be such that
³











∈ F × W1.S o
³
e f1, e S1
´
is the preferred pair from the set of
possible pairs of ﬁrm and set of coworkers for the leader. From now on,
³
e f1, e S1
´
is called the proposal.
Case a) If for all worker and ﬁrm included in the proposal, the proposal
is preferred to remaining unmatched, then the set of workers e S1 is





and T2 = WÂe S1, go to stage 2.8
Case b) If there is one agent included in the proposal for them this
proposal is worse than remaining unmatched, then the proposal is
rejected. The set of possible pairs for the leader is reduced in that
element take Φ1 (F,W)Â
³
e f1, e S1
´
as the new set of possible pairs for
w1 and a new round in step 2 begins.
Stage t: Let
³
e ft−1, e St−1
´





and Tt = Tt−1Âe St−1.
Step 1: Let wi, the worker with the lowest subindex in Tt,b et h el e a d e r .L e t
D1
t = Φi (Ft,T t).
Step 2: Let
³
e ft, e St
´




e ft, e St
´
P (wh){wh},f o ra l lwh ∈ e St, and
³















and Tt+1 = TtÂe St,i fFt+1 6=
∅ and Tt+1 6= ∅ go to the stage t +1 .
8Note that
³
e f, e S
´
may be (∅,w 1).I ns u c hac a s e ,w1 prefers to remain unemployed and is removed
from the algorithm, and a new stage begins without her.



































e ft, e St
´
or there is a worker wh such that
{wh}P (wh)
³






e ft, e St
´
and repeat the Step
2 again.
The algorithm terminates when there are no remaining workers or ﬁrms. The
remaining ﬁrms or workers are left unmatched.
The following example illustrates the algorithm.
Example 5: Let F =
©
f1,f 2,f 3ª
,a n dW = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4},w i t hp r e f e r -
ences satisfying CBC and workers’ preferences satisfying separability. Preferences are
given by the following table:




















































































































































































































.. {w1,w 2,w 3}
.. {w1,w 4}










The CBC algorithm works as follows:
Stage 1: Let T1 = W and F1 = F.
Step 1: The leader is w1. The possible pairs set for w1 is D1
1 =( F×W1)∪{w1}.
Step 2: First round: w1 proposes
³
















Second round: w1 proposes
³
















Third round: w1 proposes
³
















Fourth round: w1 proposes
³












































sFifth round: w1 proposes
³



















T1Â{w1,w 2} = {w3,w 4}.
Stage 2: Let F2 =
©
f1,f3ª
and T2 = {w3,w 4}.
Step 1: The leader is w3. The possible pairs set for w3 is D1
























2. The proposal is IR


























2. The proposal is not























2. The proposal is not IR for


















2. The proposal is IR for
f3. It is accepted. Then µ
¡
f3¢
= {w3}. The remaining agents sets






and T3 = T2Â{w3} = {w4}.
Stage 3: Let F3 =
©
f1ª
and T3 = {w4}.
Step 1: The leader is w4. The possible pairs set for w4 is D1












3. The proposal is not IR for f1.I t






=( f0,{w4}). Then the leader
at this moment, w4, must be excluded. µ(w4)={w4}.A n d F4 = F3,
T4 = T3Â{w4} = ∅.
As the set of remaining workers is empty, the algorithm terminates in the previous





















































In order to prove the Theorem 2 we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 3: The CBC algorithm always terminates in a ﬁnite number of stages.
And a matching is obtained.
As the number of workers and ﬁrms is ﬁnite, the number of possible pairs for each
worker is ﬁnite too. If every IR matching is rejected by a worker, the unemployment
alternative appears and it is accepted. Then each leader is assigned in a ﬁnite number
of steps. As the number of workers is ﬁnite the algorithm terminates in at most n
stages. As the workers are assigned to one ﬁrm or left alone, a matching is obtained.
Lemma 4: The CBC algorithm selects an IR matching.
Every pair of ﬁrm and coworkers, is assigned only if it is acceptable for everyone.
Then the matching is IR.
Lemma 5: There is no group of workers and ﬁrms that blocks the matchings
obtained in the CBC algorithm.




) that is acceptable




.T h e n w1 cannot be in a blocking group. Any
individual that is matched together with w1, as his preferences satisfy CBC, does not
prefer a matching without w1. There exists an exception: to be unemployed. But
this means that the matching assigned by the algorithm is not IR, and the previous
lemma excludes that possibility. The ﬁrm matched with w1, as its preferences satisfy
CBC, cannot prefer a group of workers without w1. Except if the preferred group is
a subset of the group that is matched to the ﬁrm. But, in such a case, as we said
before, the workers in the subset prefer to be with w1. Then every agent that goes out
from the algorithm in the ﬁrst stage, does not block. As the remaining agents only





























sproblem deﬁned in the second stage. Then there is no group that can improve the
matching for every member.
The conclusions of the previous lemmas allow us to present the next Theorem,
whose proof is straightforward from the above results.
Theorem 2 If workers’ and ﬁrms’ preferences satisfy CBC with the same ranking
and the workers’ preferences are W-lexicographic then a stable matching always exists.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented the Coalition Matching problems as a combination of two well
known models: many-to-one matching models and hedonic coalition formation prob-
lems. The appropriate extensions of suﬃcient conditions over the preferences’ domain
that guarantees the existence of stable matchings in such models are not enough in
this model. However there exists some suﬃcient conditions that have been shown in
the sections 4 and 5. These positive results, although limited, can be understood as





























sAA p p e n d i x
We present some examples without stable matchings that satisfy some conditions
over the agents’ preferences.
First, it is easy to show that a stable matching may not exist if we require Tops
Responsiveness instead of Essentiality. Note that this example 6 also satisﬁes Sepa-
rability and Coalitional Substitutability.
Example 6: Suppose F =
©
f1,f2ª
and W = {w1,w 2,w 3}. Let P be the prefer-
ence proﬁle given by the following table:
f1 f2
{w1,w 2}{ w1,w 3}
{w1,w 3}{ w2,w 3}





1 w2 : PC
2 w3 : PC
3
{w1,w 2}{ w2,w 3}{ w1,w 2,w 3}
{w1,w 2,w 3}{ w1,w 2,w 3}{ w1,w 3}
{w1,w 3}{ w1,w 2}{ w2,w 3}
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}
for all wi ∈ {w1,w 2,w 3} f1 PF
i f2.
Claim: There is no stable matching in such a problem.
We can check every possible matching:
The trivial solution in which no worker is hired: It is not stable because any
ﬁrm wants to hire any worker and this worker would accept. If some ﬁrm fi hires
{w1,w 2,w 3}: then it is not IR for the ﬁrm.
If some ﬁrm fi hires only one worker: both, worker and ﬁrm, prefer that another
worker will be hired.


































































So there is no stable matching in this problem.10¨
Second, in the section 5 we say that if the workers’ preferences satisfy CBC and we
only require Coalitional Substitutability for the ﬁrms’ preferences a stable matching
may not exist. The following example points out this fact.




W = {w1,w 2,w 3}.L e tP be the preferences proﬁle given by the following table:
f1 f2 f3
{w3}{ w1,w 3}{ w1}

























1 {w1,w 3} PC










2 {w1,w 2,w 3} PC

















{w1,w 2,w 3} PC
3 {w1,w 3} PC
3 {w2,w 3} PC
3 {w3}.
The workers’ preferences satisfy CBC and GT. The ﬁrms’ preferences only satisfy
Coalitional Substitutability.
Claim: There is no stable matching. It is easy to check that the three workers
cannot be in the same ﬁrm because w1 w o u l dp r e f e rt ow o r ka l o n ea n df3 will always
hire her. Each worker working for a diﬀerent ﬁrm is a matching that would be blocked












































































Only matchings with two workers hired by a ﬁrm are allowed. There exists only three
kinds of IR matchings that fulﬁll that condition. And the possible blocking groups
for each type are:
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